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 Recognition and social freedom 
 
Introduction 
 
The belief that freedom has an irreducibly social dimension has a long history, going back to 
at least Rousseau and developed by the likes of Marx and Arendt. To claim that freedom has a 
“social” dimension is to argue that a person’s social environment must be configured in a 
specific way for her to be free.1 However, there is disagreement about what the freedom-
constituting social conditions are.2 One view is that they are primarily recognitive. As both 
Fichte and Hegel argued, in order to be free, social agents must mutually recognise one another. 
The aim of this paper is to establish what form(s) of recognition we need to be free and why. 
 
To achieve this, I examine the work of Axel Honneth, who has produced one of the most 
extensive and influential contemporary discussions of social freedom. He constructs what I 
term a “self-realisation” account of social freedom (Section 1). This holds that the free agent 
is one who has a sufficiently positive, undamaged relation-to-self, which can be obtained only 
through the affirmative attitudes of others. Despite its many insights, I argue that ultimately it 
fails to provide an adequate conceptualisation of the freedom-recognition relationship (Section 
2). The main issue is that the self-realisation account is too focused on, and reliant upon, a 
psychological, developmental account of the free subject. I thus develop a “normative 
authorisation” account as a more plausible way of understanding social freedom in terms of 
                                                 
1 The “weak” version of this idea is that social conditions are causally necessary for becoming a free agent. The 
“strong” version is that social conditions are conceptually / constitutively part of what it means to be free. I discuss 
this distinction in Section 4. 
2 For example, collective self-determination (Rousseau, 1968), non-alienation (Marx, 1977) or non-domination 
(Pettit, 1999).  
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interpersonal recognition (Section 3). According to this model, a person is free if she is 
recognised as discursive equal able to engage in justificatory dialogue with other social agents 
about the appropriateness of her reasons for action. In other words, we are free if we can 
discourse critically about our practical agency. This requires that we recognise one another as 
having the status of free and rational beings (i.e. discursive equals). Importantly, this account 
eschews the focus on psychological development and self-realisation that underpins Honneth’s 
model. To substantiate it, I draw from Robert Pippin’s neo-Hegelian theory of freedom and 
recent work on relational autonomy.  
 
I conclude by offering some reasons in support of the normative authorisation account (Section 
4). First, I show why it is not vulnerable to the concerns I raise about Honneth’s account. I then 
defend it against the criticisms that it is too abstract and demanding. To the contrary, I show 
that it captures a basic feature of our everyday, normative interactions. Next, I argue that it can 
make good sense of the connection between self-worth and being autonomous. Hence, it can 
incorporate valuable features of Honneth’s theory whilst avoiding its difficulties. Finally, I 
suggest that it fits well with the concept of epistemic justice, which provides it with an 
important theoretical advantage over the self-realisation account. In sum, the normative 
authorisation account is an explanatorily powerful, inclusive theory of social freedom that is 
built around key elements of our social relationships as normative, rational beings and which 
fits well with wider accounts of justice and freedom.3 Thus, I argue that it represents the most 
promising way of understanding social freedom in terms of interpersonal recognition. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Consequently, even if one is unconvinced by the concerns I raise about Honneth’s account, there are still reasons 
to prefer the normative authorisation account. 
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1. Recognition, social freedom and self-realisation 
 
In Freedom’s Right, Axel Honneth (2014) argues that freedom is the dominant political value 
of contemporary Western societies. The same can be said of freedom in relation to his own 
oeuvre: a focus on the social conditions of freedom and how they can be realised in society 
runs through his major works (e.g. Honneth, 1995, 2012; Honneth and Fraser, 2003). His 
central claim is that individuals can only become free if they stand in appropriate relations of 
mutual recognition with other social agents.4 To quote Honneth, ‘we can only grasp ourselves 
as being “free” to the extent that we are addressed and treated as such by others’ (Willig, 2012: 
148). This was the basic insight developed in The Struggle for Recognition and it continues to 
underpin the views advanced in Freedom’s Right, even if the notion of intersubjective 
recognition is less explicitly discussed in the latter. As Honneth has stated, ‘My new book 
[Freedom’s Right] basically follows through on the intention of The Struggle for Recognition 
in as much as I still regard relations of mutual recognition as the condition for individual 
freedom’ (Willig, 2012: 148).5 Indeed, although Honneth’s theory of recognition is often 
focused on constructing an account of justice and legitimate social movements, grounded in 
appropriate and adequate institutionalised recognition relations, he argues that ‘the reason that 
we should be interested in establishing a just social order is that it is only under these conditions 
                                                 
4 Honneth also writes of the importance of recognition for achieving an intact identity and personality (Honneth, 
2004); self-actualisation (Honneth, 2012: 30); a successful life (1995: 174); identification with one’s qualities and 
abilities (Honneth, 2012: 81; 83) and personal integrity (Honneth, 1992). Sometimes he seems to equate these 
with being autonomous and other times as parts of the good life and just society more generally. There is not space 
here to address whether these are synonymous. Instead, I will focus on the importance of recognition for 
freedom/autonomy, which Honneth frequently construes as self-realisation. 
5 In Freedom’s Right, Honneth (2014: 15) defines freedom as ‘the autonomy of the individual’. Hence, he seems 
to treat autonomy and freedom as interchangeable. 
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that subjects can attain the most undamaged possible self-relation, and thus individual 
autonomy’ (Honneth and Fraser, 2003: 259). 
 
The above quote indicates the tight connection Honneth draws between self-realisation (“the 
most undamaged possible self-relation”) and freedom (“individual autonomy”).6 Following 
Hegel (1991) and Mead (1972), Honneth identifies three distinct forms of interpersonal 
recognition, each of which is necessary for the agent to achieve a sufficiently positive relation-
to-self and hence to be autonomous. These are love, respect and esteem, which correlate with 
three social spheres from which such recognition emanates (the family, civil society / law, and 
the state / economy). Receiving adequate recognition from each of these spheres is necessary 
if the individual is to become a free agent. For example, Honneth (1995: 163) writes of the 
‘social patterns of recognition that allow subjects to know themselves to be both autonomous 
and individuated beings within their socio-cultural environment’. Similarly, he claims that it is 
only through love, respect and esteem that a person ‘can come to see him or herself, 
unconditionally, as both an autonomous and individuated being’ (Honneth, 1995: 169). 
Honneth’s theory is thus underpinned by a developmental, psychological account of freedom 
construed as self-realisation (a move he thinks is necessary in order to “naturalise” Hegel and 
avoid the metaphysics of Spirit). The free/autonomous agent is one who has passed through 
successive stages of psychic maturation, in which sufficient self-confidence, -respect and -
esteem has been instilled. Indeed, Honneth (1995: 80) explicitly refers to Hegel’s account of 
recognition, upon which his theory is based, as a ‘developmental model’.7 
                                                 
6 Honneth defines autonomy as ‘a certain type of relation-to-self that allows us to be confident of our needs and 
beliefs, and to value our own capacities’ (Honneth, 2012: 41). He describes self-realisation as ‘a process of 
realizing, without coercion, one’s self-chosen life-goals’ (Honneth, 1995: 174). These seem mutually-referential 
descriptions of what, for Honneth, it means to be free/autonomous. 
7 This highlights the emphasis that Honneth places on the Aristotelian elements of Hegel’s work (or, perhaps, the 
Aristotelian reading he makes of Hegel). It allows Honneth to argue that there is an inner process or “logic” (an 
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This basic theoretical commitment to freedom as self-realisation, obtainable only through the 
positive recognition of others, persists into Honneth’s later work. For example, in The I in the 
We, he writes that ‘we achieve autonomy along intersubjective paths by learning to understand 
ourselves, via others’ recognition, as beings whose needs, beliefs and abilities are worth being 
realized’ (Honneth, 2012: 41). Consequently, ‘We do not acquire autonomy on our own, but 
only in relation to other people who are willing to appreciate us… Autonomy is a relational, 
intersubjective entity, not a monological achievement’ (Honneth, 2012: 41). This idea is 
developed further in an essay co-authored with Joel Anderson. They state that ‘the agentic 
competencies that comprise autonomy require that one be able to sustain certain attitudes 
toward oneself (in particular, self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem) and that these affectively 
laden self-conceptions… are dependent, in turn, on the sustaining attitudes of others’ 
(Anderson and Honneth, 2005: 130–1). Consequently, one’s relationship to oneself ‘is not a 
matter of a solitary ego reflecting on itself, but is the result of an ongoing intersubjective 
process, in which one’s attitude toward oneself emerges in one’s encounter with another’s 
attitude toward oneself’ (Anderson and Honneth, 2005: 131). 
 
In Freedom’s Right, Honneth characterises this intersubjective dimension of freedom through 
Hegel’s notion of “being free with oneself in the other”, which he sees as ‘rooted in a 
conception of social institutions in which subjects can grasp each other as the other of their 
own selves’ (Honneth, 2014: 41). Key to this is the idea of subjects ‘mutually completing each 
other’ (Honneth, 2014: 67). Interpersonal recognition thus becomes a matter of mutual 
affirmation, a sort of ego-synthesis, in which we can be / realise ourselves with each other: 
                                                 
immanent telos) to the successful self-development (i.e. flourishing) of the individual, which can only be achieved 
through affirmative social recognition. 
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‘there is a special kind of freedom in personal relationships, in which two persons enable each 
other to consummate their own selves’ (Honneth, 2014: 132). Drawing the above observations 
together, Honneth can be read as offering an account of social freedom that consists in 
individuals achieving self-realisation, understood as the development of a sufficiently positive, 
undamaged self-relation, which are only obtained by being loved, respected and esteemed by 
others.8 This ensures that individuals have sufficient self-confidence, -respect and -esteem to 
pursue and realise their conception of the good. The successful pursuit and realisation of this 
requires that others enable and promote the individual’s intentions, which is ensured by 
institutions that mediate the normative interactions between them in a recognition-facilitating 
and freedom-friendly way. 
 
 
2. Four problems with the self-realisation account 
 
I believe that Honneth is right to insight that mutual recognition should occupy a central 
position in an account of freedom. However, I question the way that he characterises the 
freedom-recognition relationship. This section identifies four such concerns. All of them stem, 
ultimately, from the developmental, psychological model of recognition and self-realisation 
underpinning Honneth’s account. 
 
                                                 
8 To quote Zurn (2015: 189), ‘the sphere of personal relations institutionally allows individuals to realize their 
inner natures – their needs, emotions, and personal characteristics – through being intersubjectively confirmed in 
their own distinctive personality… such personal relations are, according to Honneth, indispensable social 
conditions for individual self-realization’. 
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First, it reduces the importance of recognition to its impact upon the psychic development and 
flourishing of agents.9 In other words, social recognition is relevant for our freedom only 
insofar as it contributes to the achievement of a positive self-relation, which enable us to have 
the requisite confidence to pursue our life-plans. Whilst it is true that we are often very sensitive 
to the ways that others respect and esteem us (or fail to), there is more to interpersonal 
recognition relations than their contribution to a positive relation-to-self. For example, 
McBride (2013: 140) has developed an “interactionist” model of recognition, according to 
which recognition functions primarily ‘as a sort of feedback mechanism helping us to monitor 
and correct our actions’. On his view, recognition struggles between agents are to be 
understood first and foremost as struggles for authority over the interpretation of the norms 
that structure, guide and give meaning to our understanding of ourselves, our projects and our 
relations to other people and the world (cf. Pinkard, 1994). Along similar lines, Ikäheimo 
describes a “deontic dimension of personhood”, which expresses people’s capacity to ‘regulate 
their thoughts and actions, and structure their lifeworld, with norms’ (Ikäheimo, 2009: 36). 
Following Brandom, he identifies ‘intersubjective (or interpersonal) recognition as a necessary 
constituent of collective practices of norm-administration’ (ibid). Consequently, recognition 
matters, in part, because it enables us to engage in this vitally important social practice.10 
                                                 
9 Fraser (2003) criticises Honneth for “psychologising” recognition. However, Fraser’s concern is about the role 
that experiences of misrecognition play in identifying and remedying injustices. She worries that Honneth is too 
focused on the psychological effects of recognition, which delimits the critical impact of his theory as an account 
of justice. Ikäheimo (2009) also challenges Honneth’s focus on the psychological impact of recognition, claiming 
that it cannot provide the motivational source for social struggles that Honneth assigns to it. Neither Fraser nor 
Ikäheimo discuss Honneth’s theory of autonomy/social freedom and the issues that arise from his focus on 
psychological development and self-realisation. 
10 Ikäheimo sees it as vitally important to our constitution as persons and hence he embeds this idea in his 
construction of a perfectionist account of personhood, grounded in three dimensions of what makes us “persons”. 
In contrast to this aim, I am interested in its relation to what it means to be free (which may be part of what makes 
us “persons”, but this is a distinct issue to the one addressed in this paper).  
8 
 
Importantly, in neither account is recognition’s importance reduced to its psychological impact 
upon our relation-to-self. Rather, they highlight how the recognition of others enables us to 
inhabit and successfully negotiate the spaces of shared reasons, within and through which we 
structure and make sense of our actions. This insight forms the cornerstone of the normative 
authorisation account, which I describe and defend below. 
 
Second, the self-realisation account cannot explain adequately the ongoing relevance of 
recognition for people’s autonomy. If I have received enough recognition, and thus 
successfully developed my capacity for self-realisation, then it is not clear what role 
recognition has left to play with regard to my freedom. This is because Honneth’s 
‘developmental approach appears to treat recognition as sort of scaffolding necessary to the 
construction of personhood, but which then becomes redundant once personhood has been 
achieved’ (McBride, 2013: 139). Consequently, ‘it looks as if the real work of recognition is 
done once the relevant capacities have been acquired’ (McBride, 2013: 139). To be sure, 
Honneth is keen to stress that acts of dis- or non-recognition, most notably forms of physical 
violence, can shatter a person’s autonomy.11 Thus, he insists upon the enduring need to protect 
people from misrecognition. Less dramatically, our self-esteem remains sensitive to the 
positive or negative judgements that people make of our traits and abilities. However, once we 
have achieved sufficiently-positive relation-to-self, it is not obvious why the recognition of 
others may hinder or enhance our autonomy. As Kauppinen (2011: 276) notes, ‘once people 
have come to be able to respect and esteem themselves, misrecognition may simply lead them 
to resent those who do not respect or esteem them rather than prevent them from exercising 
their autonomy-constituting capacities’. The problem here is that the self-realisation account is 
                                                 
11 For a powerful, first-personal account of this, see Aftermath by Susan Brison (2002). 
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too focused on the development of autonomy and overlooks the positive role that recognition 
plays in our subsequent exercise of it (McBride, 2013: 141). Again, I expand on this below. 
 
Third, there is a notable lack of struggle between individuals in the recognition exchange as 
Honneth describes it. This might sound strange, given that Honneth has claimed that ‘each  
principle  of  recognition  has  a  specific surplus  of  validity  whose normative  significance  
is  expressed  by  the  constant  struggle  over  its  appropriate application and interpretation’ 
(Honneth and Fraser, 2003: 186).12 However, it is notable that Honneth draws from Hegel’s 
early Jena writings and does not engage with the Phenomenology. In particular, Honneth 
discusses neither the master-slave dialectic, which highlights the deep conflict that 
characterises many recognition struggles, nor the tradition inspired by this account (e.g. 
Kojéve, 1980). Furthermore, Honneth sees intersubjective struggles for recognition as leading 
to an ethical resolution in the form of mutual affirmation of people’s respective personalities 
(subjects “mutually completing” each other). He depicts this resolution as somewhat inevitable, 
or at least relatively seamless, as it is ‘a moral potential that is structurally inherent in 
communicative relations between subjects’ (Honneth, 1995: 67). Struggle between subjects is 
described as ‘a disturbance and violation of social relations of recognition’ (Honneth, 1995: 5), 
which presents it as a mis-development or pathology of “proper” ethical intersubjective 
relations (Honneth, 2008). Honneth thus ‘conceptualizes mutual recognition as an originary 
condition, a pre-existing “nexus” of ethical relations that constitutes the social’, and hence 
‘posits struggle as a secondary moment of transgression, or destruction of primary affirmative 
sociality’ (Petherbridge, 2013: 82). Consequently, ‘although Honneth advocates an agonistic 
conception of communicative action at the level of social theory, the notion of open and 
                                                 
12 He also writes that experience of the three forms of recognition cannot be described adequately ‘without 
reference to an inherent conflict’(Honneth, 1995: 162). 
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continuous struggle is somewhat contradicted by underlying assumptions of an “undamaged 
notion of intersubjectivity” that we can already detect as the underlying presupposition for a 
theory of recognition’ (Petherbridge, 2013: 32). Indeed, Honneth has acknowledged that ‘I 
have largely lost sight of the concept of “struggle” in the course of the development of my own 
theory of recognition’ (Honneth, 2011: 410). 
 
In addition, where struggle does emerge, Honneth depicts it as resulting from the experience 
of being denied recognition that one feels entitled to or deserving of. In other words, the 
struggle for recognition is a matter of rectifying a lack or absence of recognition. At best, this 
captures only part of what recognition struggles amount to. In addition to needing love, respect 
and esteem, we also struggle with people over the interpretation and appropriateness of norms 
that structure our actions. In other words, we struggle over our respective authority as 
normative, interpreting agents (Brandom, 2009: 66ff.). This necessarily involves making a 
claim on others that they recognise our authority and the validity of our assessment of their 
claims on us. We also struggle against people’s recognition, for example by denying that they 
have understood us or our actions. Finally, recognition struggles involve attempts to manage 
the recognition of others, such as controlling how we present ourselves to them and interpret 
their judgements of us (e.g. Goffman, 1971, 1990). These are complex normative interactions 
that are inherent in the exchange of reasons that characterise our lives as rational beings. They 
are ongoing, open-ended struggles that cannot be reduced to the demand that we be loved, 
respect and/or esteemed. Such recognition is not about providing something we lack to ensure 
self-realisation, but rather forms the crux of our everyday normative relations with others. 
 
Fourth, the connection between affirmative recognition and freedom does not seem as tight as 
Honneth suggests. This is because people can develop robust agency even when subjected to 
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the pervasive types of non- and misrecognition that he focuses on. As Anderson (2014: 142) 
observes, people ‘are able to lead evidently autonomous lives despite being denigrated, 
neglected, abused and disrespected’. One response is to argue that the amount or quality of 
love, respect and esteem recognition required for a person to become autonomous is very low 
and hence can be satisfied even in very deprived social circumstances. However, this move is 
unappealing because it undercuts the claim, central to Honneth’s entire critical theory, that such 
social circumstances are unjust because they contain inadequate recognition relations. Given 
that such circumstances do produce autonomous people, then we cannot charge them with 
offering insufficient autonomy-generating recognition. This seems to thwart the claim that such 
situations should be changed in the name of recognition itself (which is a major claim of much 
recognition politics and a significant part of its appeal). 
 
In voicing this final concern, it could be argued that I am misconstruing Honneth’s account. It 
is possible that Honneth’s account is intended to be a normative, rather than causal/empirical 
one.13 That is, he is outlining the ideal conditions of ethical life, which include freedom-
friendly interpersonal relations of recognition,14 rather than offering an account of what, in 
actuality, is causally necessary for an agent to become autonomous. Consequently, objections 
based on empirical counterexamples may challenge the claim that recognition is factually and 
causally necessary for attaining freedom, but they do not undermine the normative vision of 
what the “good” society looks like (i.e. a free one characterised by institutionally-secured 
interpersonal relations of love, respect and esteem). In other words, they do not undermine the 
validity of the normative account of freedom that Honneth is offering. A free and fair society 
                                                 
13 I am grateful for an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. 
14 For example: ‘The three distinct patterns of recognition… represent intersubjective conditions that we must 
further presuppose, if we are to describe the general structures of a successful life’ (Honneth, 1995: 174). 
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ought to include these forms of recognition, regardless of whether individuals necessarily 
require them in order to become/be autonomous. 
 
In response, it can be emphasised that Honneth does seem to be offering an empirical account 
of self-realisation and social freedom or, at least, an account with a strongly empirical 
grounding. To quote Kauppinen (2011: 268), ‘Honneth argues that it is an empirical matter of 
fact we can acquire and sustain such attitudes toward ourselves only when others adopt 
corresponding attitudes toward us’. Honneth himself has indicated the necessity of 
reconstructing Hegel’s initial thesis ‘in the light of empirical social psychology’ (Honneth, 
1995: 68). He suggests that ‘the subjective autonomy of the individual increases with each 
stage of mutual regard [i.e. recognition]’ and credits Mead for giving this idea ‘the systematic 
cast of an empirical hypothesis’. (Honneth, 1995: 94). This empirical grounding is also clear 
from the extensive use he makes of, and the importance he places on, object-relations theory, 
especially the work of Donald Winnicott (e.g. Honneth, 1995: 38). Honneth (2012: 204) 
describes how small children’s social process contains ‘various stages [self-confidence, -
respect and –esteem]… with the subject’s capacity for autonomy increasing at each stage’. 
Elsewhere, he claims that, ‘the possibility of the single subject's realizing individual autonomy 
depends on the precondition of being able to develop an intact self-relationship by experiencing 
social recognition’ (Honneth, 2004: 358). Finally, as quoted above, he argues that ‘we can only 
grasp ourselves as being “free” to the extent that we are addressed and treated as such by others’ 
(Willig, 2012: 148). Consequently, empirical counterexamples do seem to be a problem for his 
argument (Kauppinen, 2011: 276). 
 
Perhaps, though, Honneth’s account can be recast as primarily normative. This being so, it 
remains the case that it is an account of what it means to be free/autonomous. Honneth 
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identifies what he takes to be the relevant conditions of social freedom, namely adequate love, 
respect and esteem. The problem is that construing this as a normative account leaves one in 
the position of saying that a person can be denied such freedom-generating recognition whilst, 
at the same time, being considered free. This renders it questionable in what sense it is an 
account of what it means to be free. More precisely, it seems to undermine the claim that 
freedom has an essentially social dimension, if one can be considered free whilst lacking this 
dimension (I return to this point in Section 4). This is not to say that Honneth’s conception of 
the “just” or “fair society, or the dimensions of the “good life”, is therefore undermined and 
hence should be rejected. The idea that institutionalised relations of love, respect and esteem 
form a valuable component of a just society could may well be right, especially as a corrective 
to dominant distributive paradigms of justice. Similarly, it is likely that our well-being is 
strongly correlated with the amount and quality of affirmative recognition we receive. The 
point is that seeing them as necessary for attaining freedom, or identifying them as constitutive 
components of freedom, is questionable if people subject to pervasive disrespect can 
nevertheless develop into free/autonomous agents. 
 
 
3. Social freedom as normative authorisation 
 
The foregoing discussion suggests the need to rethink the relationship between freedom and 
recognition. As noted, the concerns with Honneth’s theory arise from the psychological, 
developmental underpinnings of the self-realisation account and its telos of the achievement of 
an undistorted, positive self-relation. Consequently, we should avoid construing freedom in 
terms of self-realisation and freedom-constituting relationships as ones in which we “mutually 
complete” one another via affirmative recognition. To do so, we can utilise an alternative 
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reading of Hegel, which focuses on our abilities to mutually authorise our status as free agents 
and our practical reasons for action, rather than on successful psychic maturation. The result is 
what I term a “normative authorisation” account of social freedom. 
 
The central idea of the normative authorisation account is that a free agent is one who is able 
to offer reasons for her actions, which can be recognised as appropriate by individuals to whom 
she justifies herself. This requires that these individuals recognise one another as free and 
rational agents capable of answering for themselves in the light of justificatory challenges. In 
other words, free beings are individuals embedded in a shared / social space of reasons, who 
can engage in justificatory dialogue concerning their actions with, and have their reasons 
“authorised” by, discursive partners (people one recognises as a fellow reason-giver and 
reason-taker). Consequently, to enjoy social freedom one must be recognised as having the 
status of a free agent, i.e. someone who acts on appropriate practical reasons. To be appropriate, 
the reasons must fit with an agent’s practical identity, that is, her core preferences, desires, 
projects and the like. In other words, her reasons must be intelligible in the light of who she is. 
 
Like Honneth, the normative authorisation account draws inspiration from Hegel. However, it 
derives from a significantly different interpretation of his philosophy, one that has been 
developed by Robert Pippin (2008). Pippin’s contention is that, for Hegel, to be free ‘is 
ultimately supposed to involve the right sort of responsiveness to norms’, which in turn 
involves ‘my being able to stand behind them and so “own up to them” in a normative way (to 
myself as well as to others)’ (Pippin, 2008: 18). Honneth would agree with Pippin’s contention 
that freedom involves ‘a certain sort of self-relation and a certain sort of relation to others; it is 
constituted by being in a certain self-regarding and a certain sort of mutually recognizing state’ 
(Pippin, 2008: 39). However, Honneth is focused on the psychological flourishing of the 
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individual, achieved through affirmative social relations. In contrast, Pippin’s reading of Hegel 
focuses on one’s interpersonally-acknowledged social status as a reason-giver and the 
intersubjective assessment of one’s reasons for actions: ‘It is in being successfully recognized 
as such a free subject, where “successfully” has to do with the achievement of a successful 
form of mutual justification, that one can then be such a free subject, can thereby come to 
regard one’s own life as self-determined and so one’s own’ (Pippin, 2008: 209). 
 
Consequently, Pippin (2008: 122) asserts that freedom, ‘is nothing but ways of actively holding 
each other to account by the demanding and giving of reasons for beliefs and actions in a social 
community’. This means that, ‘determining the degree of freedom that can be ascribed to an 
agent depends… on the kind and quality of the justifications that could be offered and accepted 
or rejected in a social community at a time’ (Pippin, 2008: 143). Hegel’s notion of freedom as 
“being with oneself in the other” is thus interpreted by Pippin (2008: 43) as ‘an achievement 
in practices wherein justificatory reasons can be successfully shared, wherein the basis of my 
justification of a course of action can be accepted by another as such a reason’. This deviates 
from Honneth’s interpretation of this concept, which is focused on “mutually completing” one 
another, achieved via the positive affirmation of our respective core personalities. A focus on 
the normative authorisation of free actions, and hence one’s status as a free agent, is absent in 
Honneth’s more Aristotelian reading of Hegel and his concomitant focus on individual self-
realisation. 
 
Following Pettit (2001), we can describe individuals who stand in this relation of normative 
authorisation to one another as “discursive equals” who possess “discursive control”. 
Discursive control denotes ‘the interaction that occurs when people attempt to resolve a 
common, discursive problem – to come to a common mind – by common, discursive means’ 
16 
 
(Pettit 2001, 67). In other words, free agents are able to “discourse” with one another; they are 
able to engage with one another in a turn-taking attempt to resolve a problem through 
considering relevant considerations or reasons (ibid). A person enjoys discursive control ‘so 
far as they are engaged in discourse by others, being authorized as someone worthy of address, 
and they will be reinforced in that freedom so far as they are publicly recognized as having the 
discursive control it involves’ (Pettit, 2001: 73). In other words, a person is free, at least in part, 
when she is recognised by others as a discursive partner: ‘When one is actively treated in a 
discursive manner by others, and thereby recognized as a free person, one enjoys discursive 
authorization or address. One is taken to be able to entertain and offer reasons that are relevant 
to the task at hand; and one is effectively treated in the manner appropriate for a fellow reason-
taker and a fellow reason-giver’ (Pettit, 2001: 77). People who recognise one another in this 
way are thus discursive equals and instantiate a relationship of normative authorisation.15 
 
There are, then, two forms of recognition operative within the normative authorisation model 
of social freedom. First, there is the recognition of the agent’s status: agents must recognise 
one another as having the status of free and rational beings. To mutually recognise our status 
as free agents, we must engage with one another as discursive equals to whom we can make 
justificatory challenges and responses. Slaves, children and individuals with severe dementia 
or other severe cognitive impairments are not recognised as having the status of a discursive 
equal. Women living in a society with deeply-embedded patriarchal norms, in which a wife is 
seen to be the property of her husband and subject to his will, have their freedom lessened as a 
result of this reduced social status. Second, there is the recognition of the agent’s reasons: the 
practical reasons that a person can offer to justify her action must be recognisable as appropriate 
                                                 
15 For a detailed discussion of the relationship between recognition theory and Pettit’s account of freedom, see 
Schuppert (2013). 
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for the person in question. In other words, an agent’s practical reasons must be such that they 
can be authorised by competent recognisers. Individuals who make decisions based on severe 
delusions or who act wildly out of character cannot have their reasons authorised and this 
renders them less free. 
 
To clarify this account, it is instructive to consider Westlund’s example of the deferential wife 
(Westlund, 2003). This is a woman who treats her husband’s interests and desires ‘as 
paramount and organizes her will around them’ (Westlund, 2003: 486). She is so deeply 
deferential that she always reasons about what to do from the perspective of her husband; she 
automatically defers to his preferences and wishes, and hence her decisions as based on his 
practical reasons. This means that her deliberation itself is deferential: if someone were to ask 
her why she and her husband are, say, moving to a new city, then she could only answer in 
terms of her husband’s reasons, which she has adopted fully as her own. Westlund contends 
that the deferential wife lacks autonomy – and, we can add, freedom – because she lacks the 
ability to answer for herself. Consequently, to be autonomous, one must ‘be appropriately 
dialogically responsive to intersubjective demands for justification. And being appropriately 
responsive to these demands requires being disposed to hold oneself answerable to the 
justificatory challenges of other agents’ (Westlund, 2003: 502–3). In other words, ‘What marks 
an agent out as self-answerable is how receptive she is to the critical perspectives of others’ 
(Westlund, 2009: 37).  
 
Westlund writes of the “disposition” to hold oneself answerable. This highlights an important 
point: in speaking of the importance of engaging in justificatory dialogue, we should think of 
this first and foremost as a capacity.16 Autonomous agents are capable of answering for 
                                                 
16 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify this point. 
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themselves. I need not, at every moment, be required to justify myself to others. However, it 
must be the case that I am able to answer for myself with reasons that are my own, which 
requires that there are people to whom to these reasons can be offered (i.e. people who 
recognise me as answerable for myself). Furthermore, it is plausible to hold that people who 
do justify themselves to others, especially when making significant life-choices, act more 
autonomously than those who do not engage in justificatory dialogue. Doing so provides the 
normative reassurance that we have acted in appropriate ways. In indicates that we have acted 
on reasons appropriate for the person we are and hence we can “own” or “stand behind” our 
deeds. As Benson (2005: 108) writes, ‘Autonomous agents specially own what they do in that 
they are properly positioned to give voice to their reasons for acting – to speak or answer for 
their acts, or to give an account of them – should others call for their reasons’.  To answer for 
oneself is to “claim” one’s actions as one’s own.17  
  
I began this paper by noting Fichte’s insight about the intrinsic connection between recognition 
and freedom. Although Pippin offers a reading of Hegel’s concept of freedom as mutual 
recognition, this core framework was prefigured by Fichte in his discussion of the “summons” 
(Fichte, 2000). Fichte believes that the “I” exists in, as and through activity.  Because the “I” 
does not have intrinsic capacities but instead is produced through action, it cannot be said to be 
free or self-determining without positing itself as such. Furthermore, it can only posit itself as 
free if it is able to act in such a way that counts as free. Specifically, it is by selecting an end 
from a set of possibilities, giving reasons for choosing this end, and achieving this end, that I 
come to see myself as a free, individuated being; that is, a being capable of transforming the 
world in accordance with its chosen goals. Fichte observed that choosing a goal and giving 
                                                 
17 It also enacts a positive feedback loop, insofar as actually justifying ourselves to others enables us to see 
ourselves as discursive equals and solidifies our status as equals in the eyes of those we answer to. 
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reasons for this choice (i.e. justifying an action) requires other people to whom one justifies 
oneself. This is where the summons comes in. The summons thus consists of a subject being 
challenged by other rational beings to justify its choices or actions (Fichte, 2000: 31). In being 
asked to justify itself, the subject is treated as a free and rational being; through resolving to 
act in light of the summons the subject comes to see itself as free and rational. Simultaneously, 
the summons to engage in free activity by other free beings causes us to posit free beings 
outside of ourselves (Fichte, 2000: 41). Crucially, this must be a mutual process of recognition: 
‘One cannot recognize the other if both do not mutually recognize each other; and one cannot 
treat the other as a free being, if both do not mutually treat each other as free (Fichte, 2000: 
42). 
 
The idea of normative authorisation can thus be understood as a form of “summons”, in which 
an agent makes a claim on or petition to another agent to recognise their practical agency, 
which in turn requires that the agent recognise the second party as a competent judge: as a free 
and rational agent capable of normatively authorising their actions and hence their status as a 
free being. Normative authorisation is thus a relation of mutual answerability in which agents 
claim, and recognise the other as having, the authority to answer for themselves qua free and 
rational beings. Along these lines, Benson (1994: 660) has argue that to be autonomous one 
must have a sense of oneself ‘as being competent to answer for one’s conduct in light of 
normative demands that, from one’s point of view, others might appropriately apply to one’s 
actions’. He later refers to this requirement as “taking ownership” of one’s actions, which 
consists in seeing oneself as having a distinctive authority over one’s conduct (Benson, 2005). 
Such authority ‘concerns agents’ position to speak for their actions in the face of potential 
criticisms’ (Benson, 2005: 102). A person such as Westlund’s deferential wife lacks this 
authority because she is unable to take ownership of her actions. She does not see herself as 
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able to answer for her actions in the face of questions or criticisms from others and she cannot 
offer reasons that she claims as her own. Thus, she cannot engage in justificatory dialogue as 
a discursive equal and her autonomy is reduced as a result. 
 
To conclude this overview, three clarifications should be made. First, in speaking of the free 
agent as acting on “appropriate” reasons, I mean reasons that accord with her practical identity, 
that is, her values, beliefs, desires, projects, character and the like. The free agent must have a 
sufficient sense of who she is and be able to act in ways that are consistent with this. I take this 
to be relatively uncontroversial: someone who is severely self-deluded or consistently acts out 
of character (e.g. who is deeply erratic or akrasic) lacks an important aspect of autonomy. At 
the very least, they are less free than someone who successfully shapes their life around their 
core values, desires and preferences. Second, the model requires that I receive normative 
authorisation from discursive partners. These are people who can assess the appropriateness of 
my reasons for action. For this to be the case, I must recognise them as free and rational beings, 
with whom I inhabit a shared space of reasons. If I recognise a person as a discursive partner 
(i.e. a competent judge), then their recognition will matter to me; I recognise them as capable 
of recognising me.18 Discursive partners reciprocally authorise one another as free beings. This 
emphasises the importance of mutual recognition for social freedom and clarifies the form it 
should take. Third, people can be considered more or less autonomous, depending on how well 
they satisfy the conditions that comprise it, and hence we should understand freedom and 
autonomy as coming in degrees. The normative authorisation account identifies a constitutive, 
social condition of freedom, which can be enjoyed to a greater or lesser extent. There can also 
be other, non-social conditions, such as an adequate level of critical self-knowledge. However, 
                                                 
18 This need not be voluntary. Sometimes we are very sensitive to the recognition of others, despite wanting to be 
indifferent to it. 
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the social dimension is non-substitutable, meaning that the less one is answerable for oneself, 
the less free one is, regardless of the extent to which other conditions are satisfied. 
 
 
4. Defending the normative authorisation account 
 
When outlining some concerns with the self-realisation account, I suggested that someone 
could lack Honneth’s freedom-generating recognition yet nevertheless be considered 
free/autonomous. However, the same objection might be levelled against the normative 
authorisation account. For example, we can imagine a woman living in an extremely patriarchal 
society, in which she is denied recognition of her status as a discursive equal capable of 
answering for herself, who nevertheless struggles against her oppressive conditions and hence 
engages in acts of resistance. Is it plausible to hold that she is non-autonomous because she 
lacks the required social recognition? If the normative authorisation model asserts that this is 
the case, then it could be a strong reason to reject it.19 
 
Several points can be made in response to this. First, it is rare that people are denied such status 
recognition altogether. There are likely to be members of the society who do recognise 
women’s discursive equality, even if many others do not. Given that we should think of 
autonomy as coming in degrees, we can agree that the woman is autonomous to some extent. 
Nevertheless, we can hold that she would be more autonomous if she enjoyed greater 
recognition of her status as a discursive equal. After all, her struggles against her oppressive, 
patriarchal conditions can be described, at least in part, as a struggle for greater freedom. She 
will be better able to own her actions, to shape her life and to see herself as an independent 
                                                 
19 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection. 
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agent if she enjoys a more robust and extensive status as a discursive equal. Furthermore, the 
normative authorisation model is an account of social freedom. It can allow that there are other 
dimensions of freedom. Women in deeply patriarchal societies who are denied recognition of 
their practical agency may nevertheless exhibit some autonomy traits whilst lacking other 
aspects of autonomy and hence being less autonomous than they could be. To enjoy a fuller, 
more robust freedom they must also meet the social conditions set out by the normative 
authorisation account. 
 
It is also important to highlight that, for an account of freedom/autonomy to be truly social, a 
person’s freedom must be constituted (at least in part) by external conditions. This is because 
otherwise there is nothing to distinguish it from procedural, individualist accounts of freedom. 
Procedural accounts identify the autonomy-conferring property or process to be something 
internal to the agent, e.g. the alignment between first- and second-order desires (Frankfurt, 
1988) or non-alienated, reflective endorsement of one’s personal characteristics (Christman, 
2009). They thus make no essential reference to other agents or features of the external world 
when specifying the conditions of autonomy.20 These accounts can allow, and sometimes 
emphasise, that the acquisition of the requisite property is causally dependent on social factors 
(e.g. Christman, 2009; Dworkin, 1988; Friedman, 2003). However, they deny that such social 
factors are constitutive of autonomy itself. This means that they are weakly, rather than strongly 
social. 
 
In contrast, a strongly social account sees some part(s) of the external world as an essential 
condition of autonomy (e.g. Garnett, 2014; Oshana, 2006; Westlund, 2009). In other words, 
                                                 
20 Hence, the distinction between proceduralist and relational accounts is sometimes defined as being between 
internalist and externalist accounts (e.g. Oshana, 1998). 
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one lacks autonomy – or, at least, an important dimension of autonomy – if this condition is 
absent. This means that it is possible for a person to be rendered less free, or even unfree 
altogether, by their social circumstances alone, regardless of the individual’s beliefs, desires 
and actions. As Oshana (2006: 49) argues, an implication of strongly social accounts is that it 
is possible for two individuals to be identical in terms of their psychological properties, ‘but to 
differ nonetheless with respect to their status as autonomous beings. This difference is 
explained in terms of social variance in their social circumstances’ (Oshana, 2006: 49). The 
normative authorisation account is strongly social insofar as being able to answer for oneself 
to others, and hence enjoying the socially-recognised status as a discursive partner, is a 
constitutive component of freedom/autonomy.21 Someone who does not stand in this relation 
to others is less free than someone who does, even if they are psychologically indistinguishable. 
 
It is instructive to highlight the contrast here with Honneth’s account, which seems to be only 
weakly social. Honneth equates self-realisation with autonomy, defining the latter as individual 
self-determination (2014: 18) and the identification and realisation of our aims (2014: 28). 
Thus, what it means to be autonomous is to have a certain positive relation-to-self, which 
requires that we are loved, respected and esteem by others. However, this social condition is 
not conceptually part of being autonomous. If someone could obtain self-realisation without 
interpersonal recognition, then they would be as autonomous as someone who had enjoyed the 
affirmative recognition of others. Thus, there is little, if anything, that separates Honneth’s 
account from procedural accounts that highlight the causal importance of social conditions. As 
Kauppinen (2011: 274–275) has observed, there is thus ‘a danger of false advertising’ when 
Honneth writes of “the profoundly intersubjective nature of autonomy” (Anderson and 
                                                 
21 As quoted above, Pippin (2008: 39) argues that, freedom ‘is constituted by being in a certain self-regarding and 
a certain sort of mutually recognizing state’ (emphasis added). 
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Honneth, 2005: 145). Consequently, there is reason to prefer the normative authorisation 
account insofar as it is strongly social, rather than weakly so. This applies even if Honneth’s 
account is construed as primarily normative, as it still deems interpersonal recognition to be 
causally, rather than conceptually, connected to individual freedom. 
 
A related set of objections is that the normative authorisation account is too abstract, 
demanding and/or elusive. For example, it might be seen to require that we constantly justify 
our every action to others and hence possess hyper-rational powers of reason-giving. If so, then 
it may seem problematically exclusionary, counting very few people as free. In response, it can 
be reiterated that the account is first and foremost concerned with the capacity to engage in an 
intersubjective justificatory exchange. Free agents must be able to hold one another answerable 
and recognise one each other as such, rather than constantly demanding and giving reasons at 
every moment. Relatedly, the requisite recognition of one another as discursive equals and the 
attendant justificatory exchanges that constitute the social dimension of freedom need not be 
done consciously or under that description. In other words, one need not see oneself as acting 
as an answerable agent, and holding others to account, in order to meet the requirements of the 
normative authorisation account. Instead, what is required is that people do actually recognise 
themselves and each another as discursive equals. Thus, one need not be constantly checking 
to confirm that one is acting autonomously. It is sufficient that one does, in actuality, enjoy this 
status and acts accordingly. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the mutual authorisation required described by the 
account is enacted by most of us much of the time, without too much (if any) reflection, effort 
or struggle.  We rarely have any difficulty in justifying our reasons for action and having them 
recognised as legitimate in our day-to-day interactions. Indeed, this interaction is part-and-
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parcel of what Pettit and Smith term the “conversational stance”, wherein ‘we put our beliefs 
[and reasons] on the line and expose them to the reality test that others represent for us’ (Pettit 
and Smith, 1996: 430). This is a process in which people ‘authorize their interlocutors and in 
turn assume authorization by them’ (Pettit and Smith, 1996: 432). The conversational stance is 
a basic, pervasive feature of interpersonal relations and as such imbues our interactions with 
one another. A strength of the normative authorisation account is that it captures this common 
and central aspect of our social interactions: we are normative beings embedded in shared 
spaces of reasons and we are constantly challenging others’ actions and justifying our own. 
This is a major reason why social recognition is of ongoing relevance to the exercise of our 
autonomy. We want assurances from others that our actions are intelligible in the light of who 
we are (i.e. our practical projects, commitments, values and relationships). Similarly, we are 
constantly involved in interpreting norms and their appropriateness, and the recognition of 
others is crucial in receiving the reassurance that we have got it right. Hence, unlike the self-
realisation account, the normative authorisation model can explain easily the continual 
importance of recognition for people’s freedom. It can also accommodate better the complexity 
of recognition struggles, insofar as they relate to the administration of norms within our shared 
space of reasons. We want to be recognised as authoritative within this domain and struggle 
for others’ recognition of our normative competency, which includes managing how we present 
ourselves to others in order to gain their recognition. Such struggles are not about obtaining the 
requisite resources for self-realisation, but rather about securing our status as rational agents.  
 
The normative authorisation account can also incorporate the relevance of self-confidence, -
respect and -esteem for our autonomy. Rather than being constitutive of self-realisation and 
hence freedom, these positive self-relations are instrumentally valuable insofar as they can 
facilitate our ability to engage in the requisite justificatory exchange that demarcates 
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autonomous agents. In other words, having a robust sense of self-worth, typically fostered by 
being recognised positively by others, is likely to ensure that one is able to answer for oneself 
and make claims on others for their recognition, i.e. for their authorisation of one’s status as a 
free agent and the appropriateness of one’s reasons for action. However, the cultivation of a 
positive self-relation is not constitutive of what it means to be autonomous, which is a matter 
of holding oneself answerable to others for one’s actions and having the socially-recognised 
status of a discursive equal. The normative authorisation account avoids the developmental, 
psychological claim that affirmative interpersonal recognition is necessary for becoming free. 
It is thus untroubled by examples of people who seem autonomous despite being denied love, 
respect and/or esteem. The autonomy-conferring trait is the ability to answer for oneself, not a 
sufficiently-positive relation-to-self. 
 
A final appealing feature of the normative authorisation account is that it fits well with the 
concept of epistemic injustice. Occurrences of epistemic injustice harm one as a knower. 
Specifically, (a) one is not treated as an epistemic equal, because one’s assertions are given 
less credibility than they merit by hearers (typically because the hearers hold prejudicial views 
about a social group to which one belongs); or (b) one lacks the hermeneutical resources to 
make sense of one’s experiences in ways that allow one to perceive features of one’s social 
interactions or environment as unjust or immoral. This renders one less able, or even powerless, 
to challenge oppressive relationships, institutions or discourses. These occurrences are unjust 
because they wrong ‘someone in their capacity as a subject of knowledge, and thus in a capacity 
essential to human value; and the particular way in which testimonial injustice does this is that 
a hearer wrongs a speaker in his capacity as a giver of knowledge, as an informant’ (Fricker 
2007, 5). An epistemic injustice undermines a person’s dignity; it erodes their status as an 
epistemic equal entitled to respect as a rational knower (Fricker 2007, 44). 
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Within the framework of the normative authorisation account, it is clear how a person’s 
autonomy can be eroded by the epistemic practices of society. First, epistemic injustices 
undermine one’s status as a discursive equal. They deny one the requisite recognition of being 
an epistemic equal, i.e. a rational knower, and hence someone capable of answering for herself. 
For example, epistemic injustice occurs when one’s beliefs and claims are systematically 
discounted or dismissed altogether in virtue of who you are (e.g. a woman or black). Second, 
epistemic injustice can prevent one’s practical reasons from being recognised as valid. This 
arises when one’s experiences, desires and reasons are subject to hermeneutic injustice and 
hence dismissed as incoherent. For example, certain discourses of sex/gender – historically 
common within the medical community – depict trans identities as pathological and indicative 
of a failure to develop a “normal” sex/gender identity. Within these terms, a person’s desire 
and decision to change their sex/gender cannot be recognised as a rational decision, but rather 
the expression of a malformed identity or medical condition in need of being cured.  
 
This is not only epistemically-troubling, but, for the normative authorisation account, it is also 
autonomy-undermining. If part of what it means to be autonomous is that one’s reasons can be 
socially-authorised as appropriate bases for action, then we must attend to the ways that social 
discourses shape how people’s reasons are understood and assessed. In particular, we must 
examine how social discourses of identity can prevent people’s reasons from being recognised 
as appropriate and undermine our ability to recognise people as epistemic and discursive 
equals, capable of giving and assessing reasons. Crucially, this suggests that establishing 
epistemically-just social relations is a condition of achieving social freedom and vice-versa. 
The normative authorisation model depicts a free society as one characterised by epistemic 
justice and gives a clear explanation why this is so. This is a strength of the account and 
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provides further reason to prefer it over Honneth’s self-realisation account, even if the latter is 
construed as primarily normative. At the same time, it can accommodate the instrumental 
importance of ensuring people develop a positive relation-to-self. Hence, it can retain 
Honneth’s insight that the good society is characterised by institutionally-mediated affirmative 
social relations of recognition (but it gives a better account of why this matters for people’s 
freedom). The normative authorisation perspective thus offers an inclusive, explanatorily 
powerful account of the social dimension freedom, which fits well with wider accounts of a 
just and free society. It can do this because it avoids the focus on psychological development 
and self-realisation, centring instead on our status as discursive equals able to answer of 
ourselves through the mutual assessment of reasons for action. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have sought to develop a “normative authorisation” account as a plausible 
characterisation of the social dimension of freedom, grounded in intersubjective recognition. I 
have argued that this consists in our recognising one another as discursive equals, i.e. free and 
rational agents to whom we are able to justify our actions and make justificatory challenges to. 
Drawing from recent work in relational autonomy, I characterised this as possessing the 
capacity to answer for oneself. This is a strongly social account, meaning that it is a constitutive 
condition of being free/autonomous. The less one is recognised as discursive equals and/or the 
weaker is one’s ability to answer for oneself, then the less free one is. I contrasted this model 
with Axel Honneth’s account of social freedom, which focuses on the relations of recognition 
necessary for people to achieve self-realisation and hence autonomy. I raised several worries 
about it, which derive from its developmental underpinning and its focus on achieving a 
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positive relation-to-self. This account fails to explain the ongoing relevance of recognition for 
the successful exercise of our autonomy and reduces the relevance of recognition to its 
contribution to our psychic flourishing. It also seems vulnerable to empirical counterexamples 
of individuals who achieve autonomy despite growing up in oppressive circumstances. Finally, 
it does not give an adequate account of our interpersonal struggles over recognition, focusing 
solely on the rectification of absent or insufficient love, respect and esteem. 
 
Rather than being focused on self-realisation, achieved via affirmative social recognition, the 
normative authorisation account is first and foremost about being recognised as having the 
social status of free and rational agents (i.e. discursive equals). I highlighted several strengths 
of this account. First, it avoids the problems levelled at Honneth’s account. Second, it captures 
a basic feature of our social interactions as normative beings, in which we struggle over the 
interpretation and appropriateness of practical norms. Relatedly, it expresses the fact that we 
often seek to justify ourselves to others and seek their normative authorisation that the beliefs 
and reasons we have acted on make sense for the type of person we are. It can also incorporate 
the instrumental importance of having a strong sense of self-worth. This is not because it is 
necessary for achieving self-realisation, but rather because it facilitates our capacity to answer 
for ourselves. Finally, I showed how the account fits well with recent work on epistemic 
injustice. Securing people’s social freedom, construed as normative authorisation, requires 
ensuring epistemically-just social relations. These are strong reasons in favour of the normative 
authorisation account. Hence, I suggest it represents the most promising way of conceptualising 
the social dimension of freedom. 
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